Jihadawi Harekat: Context, Objectives, and Internal Contradictions
"Authoritarian leaders do repeat their tactics, once as tragedy, second as farce," as Marx once wrote in his article, The Eighteenth Brumaire.
On February 5, the regime in Ethipia released a documentary film entitled "Jihadawi Harakat", which was wrongly put as "Jihadic Wars"(haraka is movement in Arabic). The documentary is not very different from the long list of multiple propaganda wars the ruling party has been running for several years. In fact, this film is a bit unlucky to have come after so many of its predecessors which were already dissected and eviscerated by many an observer. I think if at all some of its predecessors were a tragedy in some ways, I think this specific documentary will surely be regarded by too many people as a farce.
But democratic governments are in many ways limited in what they can do to create and shape public opinions (at least in many matters that affect people’s lives). There is, for example, a limit to the lie they tell people in public media. There are many reasons for this: 1) While trying to hoodwink their people, politicians in democratic states do know that, depending on the degree and significance of the things they lie about, they are doing this at the risk of losing power (if incumbents) or coming to power (if oppositions) in the coming elections. 2) They also know that it may not be quite easy to get away with one’s misdemeanor due to the high risk of being caught up somewhere in the multiple institutional frameworks of checks and balances. 3) There is, too, a plethora of independent sources of information in the country that would make it quite difficult for politicians to lie and be taken seriously by the wider public 4) Many of these people are also educated and can easily detect the logical or factual (or both) worth of what politicians say. Although it is not correct to assert a necessary relationship between democracy and high rates of education, it is not implausible to argue that most democracies do have higher rates of education, on average, than most non-democracies. All these factors tell us that beguiling people in democracies maybe possible in many occasions, but it is always conducted at the risk of self-beguiling.
We can now come back to the EPRDF's deceptive propaganda machine and insert it into general framework mentioned above. Faced with one of the most formidable---in terms of size, persistence, and public visibility---opposition to its policies, it has to engage itself in massive counter-propaganda. It has to try to shape public opinion in a context where it is standing on its last legs of public legitimacy. The last documentary is one among many others produced to this end. The Muslim rights movement has fearlessly targeted the government’s anti-secularist policies and some of its propaganda institutions, and hence it needs to show, however unconvincingly, that what it claims about the movement is right. No doubt this message is directed to multiple stakeholders in the country's politics: Christians, Muslims, and Western governments (the last one won’t be dealt with here in this paper). The general idea behind all these messages to all these stakeholders is to divide opinion about the current Muslim activism and solicit further support--moral, political, and financial--for its anti-freedom projects.
The third factor has something to do with the coming elections. It goes without saying that the EPRDF's record in electoral politics is utterly tragic. But I believe that it has all chances of being more so in the elections to come soon. This is because, I frankly assume, the EPRDF is, more than ever before, ruling over a population whose sympathy for their government has nearly come to a literal end. This will surely force the party to stage an even more unfair electoral process that could ensure its political longevity. But at the same time, it has to try its best to gain the votes of as many people as possible by diverting the attention of the people from their daily sorrows especially ineconomicl terms. The release of the documentary at this time, therefore, has some apparent electoral benefits, too. These factors, I believe, can help us explain the timing of the documentary.
Let me say more on the specific objectives of the government in broadcasting this documentary now. As the explanations for the timing indicate, the major objectives are forestalling inter-religious and intra-religious alliance/unity, and ensuring “favorable” (to the party in power) electoral climate. The first deals with minimizing the possibility of the forging of a Muslim-Christian (and in a way, Christian-Christian) alliance on the question of religious freedom. With the release of JH, the ruling party might think that the minimization of such a possibility has been achieved in two ways: by demonizing the Muslims' movement as a “terrorist” or “terrorist-led” one, it is supposed to create abject fear, nevermind a spirit of cooperation, among ordinary Christians. Further, it is also a strong message to any Christians in the country that the shadow of Islamic fundamentalism is currently working in tandem with other secular "terrorist" organizations like the G7. Hence, the government warns, it is important to distance oneself not only from the Muslim activists, but also from all those secular groups that support the activism. This message is especially important when seen in line with two timely facts: the major vocal detractors of what is seen as the government sabotage of Christian-Christian unity are to be found in the diaspora and have been not only oppositional in their general political outlook towards the government but also largely supportive of the Muslim cause. So, the government is in a dire necessity to divorce the Christians inside the country not only from their fellow Muslim citizens but also from their co-religionists in the diaspora at least for some time to come.
Moreover, the ruling party is also campaigning for elections, so to speak, by releasing this documentary. "I'm protecting", the EPRDF seems to be telling the dissatisfied electorate (especially the Christians this time around), "the unity, development, and peace of the country from being taken hostage by a bunch of bearded, dangerous Islamic terrorists”. A final goal that has to do with elections is to preclude the potential capitalization, on the part of the Ethiopian opposition parties operating inside the country, on the volatile religious situation in Ethiopia. The opposition parties, it is expected, will be afraid of vocally endorsing the Muslim demands and sympathizing with their sufferings in their (the parties’) attempt at buying votes since the whole Muslim right movement has now been demonized as “Islamist” in goal and terrorist in methodology. As a result, in the eyes of the government, the Muslim activism will be left with no one to insert it into mainstream politics as a legitimate struggle for freedom or make of it a good opportunity for canvassing Muslim votes.
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